Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Courts by Carpio, Ivan et al.
Human Rights Brief
Volume 18 | Issue 1 Article 8
2010
Updates from the International and
Internationalized Criminal Courts
Ivan Carpio
American University Washington College of Law
Lindsay Roberts
American University Washington College of Law
Zsofia Young
American University Washington College of Law
Christopher Tansey
American Univeristy Washington College of Law
Paul Rinefierd
American University Washington College of Law
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the
International Law Commons
This Column is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carpio, Ivan, Lindsay Roberts, Zsofia Young, Christopher Tansey, Paul Rinefierd, and Slava Kuperstein. "Updates from the
International and Internationalized Criminal Courts." Human Rights Brief 18, no. 1 (2010) 42-50.
Authors
Ivan Carpio, Lindsay Roberts, Zsofia Young, Christopher Tansey, Paul Rinefierd, and Slava Kuperstein
This column is available in Human Rights Brief: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol18/iss1/8
42
international criMinal tribunal 
For tHe ForMer yugoSlavia
trial cHaMber orderS inveStigation 
oF tHe proSecutor in ŠeŠelJ caSe
On June 29, 2010, Trial Chamber III 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ordered 
an independent investigation into allega-
tions of witness intimidation raised against 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in 
the case of Vojislav Šešelj. The Motion 
for Contempt, filed by Šešelj on March 
23, 2007, alleges that ICTY prosecutors, 
Carla Del Ponte, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff, 
and Daniel Saxon, are responsible for, 
among other allegations, threatening, ille-
gally paying, and blackmailing witnesses. 
Evaluating how the ICTY applies its rules 
of procedure in this case offers insight into 
the tribunal’s developing jurisprudence on 
contempt of court proceedings, particularly 
those implicating the OTP.
Šešelj himself has been subject to alle-
gations of witness intimidation. On July 24, 
2009, Trial Chamber II convicted Šešelj of 
contempt for violating protective mea-
sures granted to witnesses, and sentenced 
him to fifteen months imprisonment. Trial 
Chamber II held that by disclosing infor-
mation identifying three protected wit-
nesses in a book published on his website, 
Šešelj violated Rule 77(A)(ii) of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. His 
was the first contempt case tried at the 
ICTY against a defendant already on trial 
for war crimes. Prior to the conclusion of 
proceedings before the Appeals Chamber, 
on February 4, 2010, Trial Chamber II 
issued an order for additional contempt 
charges related to information in his book 
that potentially identifies eleven other pro-
tected witnesses. The Appeals Chamber 
upheld Trial Chamber II’s decision in the 
initial contempt case on May 19, 2010. 
The second contempt case against Šešelj 
remains in the pre-trial stage.
Šešelj filed a motion for contempt 
against the OTP on March 23, 2007. The 
trial chamber stayed Šešelj’s motion for 
contempt on May 15, 2007 to avoid delay 
of trial. Trial Chamber III reconsidered its 
decision after hearing multiple witnesses 
testify to intimidation and pressure from 
the OTP during the prosecution’s prelimi-
nary interviews. The trial chamber acted, 
sua sponte, to invoke Rule 77(C)(ii) of the 
ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
which states: “Where the Prosecutor, in 
the view of the Chamber, has a conflict 
of interest with respect to the relevant 
conduct, direct the Registrar to appoint an 
amicus curiae to investigate the matter and 
report back to the Chamber as to whether 
there are sufficient grounds for instigating 
contempt proceedings.” The trial chamber 
directed the registrar to appoint an amicus 
curiae investigator to look into Šešelj’s 
allegations and report back within six 
months.
Although the ICTY’s system for inves-
tigating and adjudicating contempt of 
court in witness intimidation cases lacks 
the benefits of decades of refinement, 
its procedural rules provide a framework 
for addressing these allegations. Article 
77 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence provides mechanisms for 
addressing witness intimidation perpe-
trated by any persons “who knowingly 
and willfully interfere with its admin-
istration of justice.” The power to try 
contempt of court in the ICTY and other 
international criminal tribunals is derived 
from a tribunal’s inherent power, an Anglo-
American concept applied to international 
courts.
While Šešelj’s case tested the ICTY’s 
established process for holding contempt of 
court proceedings, the tribunal’s procedure 
for investigating the OTP is a distinct prac-
tice. The trial chamber broke new ground 
by reconsidering Šešelj’s motion against 
the OTP and initiating an investigation 
of the prosecutors. In the past, the ICTY 
has tried defendants, defense attorneys, 
witnesses, and the ICTY’s former spokes-
person for contempt using its standard pro-
cedure. However, this is the first time that 
the ICTY has ordered an amicus curiae to 
investigate a former Chief Prosecutor. This 
independent investigation has significant 
potential to shape international criminal 
jurisprudence if the trial chamber initiates 
contempt proceedings against the OTP’s 
Del Ponte, Uertz-Retzlaff, and Saxon.
boSnian court upHoldS croatian 
ruling againSt ForMer croatian 
Mp under bilateral treaty
On September 29, 2010, the Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a domestic 
court tasked with adjudicating war crimes, 
upheld a Croatian Supreme Court ver-
dict sentencing Branimir Glavaš, a former 
major general in the Croatian Army and 
former Croatian Member of Parliament, 
to eight years in prison for war crimes. 
On May 8, 2009, a Croatian district court 
sentenced Glavaš to ten years in prison for 
the torture and killing of Serb civilians in 
his hometown of Osijek, Croatia during 
the 1990s Balkan conflicts. The Croatian 
Supreme Court later reduced his sentence 
to eight years’ imprisonment. Immediately 
following his conviction, Glavaš report-
edly left Croatia, fleeing to Bosnia where 
his dual citizenship protected him from 
extradition. Bosnian police arrested Glavaš 
on the basis of a bilateral treaty enacted 
by Bosnia and Croatia in February 2010, 
establishing mutual recognition of criminal 
judgments. The Glavaš decision is signifi-
cant in that it demonstrates a policy shift 
among Balkan states towards cooperat-
ing to apprehend international fugitives. 
The current level of cooperation between 
these former Yugoslavian states is a far 
cry from the extradition difficulties the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) encountered in 
the early days of its mandate.
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia have only 
recently established extradition and verdict 
recognition treaties. In the past, individuals 
convicted in the courts of one state often 
used their dual citizenship as a means to 
escape punishment in that state by fleeing 
to neighboring countries in which they 
have dual citizenship. For example, before 
upholding Croatia’s ruling in the Glavaš 
case, Bosnia and Herzegovina denied 
Croatia’s request to extradite Glavaš. On 
August 25, 2010, Croatia did extradite 
Sretko Kalinić to Serbia based on an extra-
dition agreement the two countries signed 
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in June. As a result of this cooperation, 
Kalinić was convicted in absentia for the 
murder of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinćić in 2003.
While the emergence of criminal jus-
tice treaties between these Balkan coun-
tries, such as that which led to the arrest 
of Glavaš, is a recent development, state 
cooperation with the ICTY in investigating 
and arresting indictees has been requisite 
for the functioning of the tribunal since its 
inception. The ICTY became operational 
while the Yugoslav conflicts were still 
ongoing, a time at which many politi-
cal and military officials that would later 
be found guilty of war crimes were still 
operating with impunity. Croatia estab-
lished its extradition treaty with the ICTY 
in 1996 during the presidency of Franjo 
Tuđman. Section IV of the Legislations 
Implementing the ICTY Statute addresses 
arrest and extradition of suspects to the 
tribunal and declares that an “investigative 
judge of the competent county court shall 
. . . decide on the Tribunal’s warrant for 
arrest of an accused,” essentially preserv-
ing Croatia’s power to decline an extradi-
tion request. However, while Tućman facili-
tated transfers of Bosnian Croats to the 
tribunal, including Tihomir Blaškić and 
Zlatko Aleksovski in 1996, the Croatian 
government maintained that the ICTY 
lacked jurisdiction over Croatian military 
exercises conducted in Croatian territory. 
In her address to the UN Security Council 
in 2000, former Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte 
referred to Croatia’s cooperation in pre-
vious years as a “policy of obstruction 
and delay.” This view persisted until after 
Tućman’s death in 1999 and the election 
of Ivo Sanader who, in 2004, facilitated 
the surrenders of Ivan Čermak, Tuđman’s 
Assistant Minister of Defense and Mladen 
Markač, a former Croatian Army general 
involved in Operation Storm, as well as 
several other Bosnian Croats.
Extradition between Balkan states and 
the ICTY has historically been a heavily 
politicized issue. As of 2001, part of U.S. 
aid to Serbia was conditional on Serbia’s 
cooperation with the ICTY. As Croatia, 
Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina attempt 
to join the European Union (EU), other 
European states are making their support 
contingent on cooperation with the ICTY.
When deciding whether to extradite 
someone who is both a national hero 
and an alleged war criminal, governments 
often stall for years before succumbing to 
external political pressure. In Croatia, Ante 
Gotovina maintains some popular support 
despite his alleged role in causing Serb 
civilian casualties during Operation Storm. 
Ratko Mladić, the former top-ranking gen-
eral for the Republika Sprska, is regarded 
by many in Serbia as a national hero 
despite his alleged command responsibil-
ity for the Srebrenica genocide. Despite 
Serbia’s professed inability to capture 
Mladić, critics contend that Serbia has 
been stalling for years and has had sev-
eral opportunities to capture him. Critics 
further allege that, as they did with the 
arrest of Radovan Karadžić, Serbia could 
continue to stall for years before succumb-
ing to ICTY pressure. Some EU countries, 
such as the Netherlands, see the capture 
and extradition of Mladić by Serbia as a 
necessary factor in establishing Serbia’s 
cooperation with the ICTY. They demand 
proof of cooperation before supporting 
Serbia’s acceptance into the EU.
The Balkan states weigh different 
domestic interests in cooperating with each 
other than they do in cooperating with 
the ICTY. The recent trend toward bilat-
eral cooperation is reflective of significant 
sociopolitical changes in the Balkans since 
the end of the conflict, and in response to 
criminals convicted in state courts find-
ing impunity in bordering countries. Thus, 
countries resolved to end impunity out 
of mutual domestic interest. Distinctly, 
state cooperation with the ICTY involves 
states weighing domestic political interests 
against their desire to appeal to the interna-
tional community. In the past, states often 
valued protecting national heroes and poli-
ticians accused of war crimes above inter-
national cooperation. For Serbia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovia, the economic 
benefits of joining the EU have created a 
significant incentive to cooperate with the 
ICTY. As such, increased cooperation with 
the ICTY in recent years and the upsurge 
in cooperation between Balkan states are 
motivated by different factors. Because 
different motivating factors support coop-
eration with the ICTY than support bilat-
eral cooperation, the problems the ICTY 
initially faced in implementing extradition 
treaties are unlikely to be present in imple-
menting bilateral cooperation.
Ivan Carpio, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia for the Human Rights Brief.
international criMinal tribunal 
For rWanda
Security council aMendS ictr 
Statute to proMote FulFillMent oF 
coMpletion Strategy
On May 28, 2010, the President of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), Judge Dennis Byron, submitted 
the tribunal’s biannual report, S/2010/259, 
to the UN Security Council detailing the 
ICTR’s recent progress and challenges in 
fulfilling its completion strategy. The ICTR 
recognized that a shortage of judges and 
staff has affected its ability to efficiently 
conduct fair trials and deliver timely judg-
ments. In response to the ICTR’s report, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1932 
(2010) to extend the terms of permanent 
and ad litem judges and amend Article 12 
ter of the ICTR Statute. Amended Article 
12 ter permits the Secretary-General to 
“appoint a former permanent or ad litem 
judge of the International Tribunal or of 
the International Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia [(ICTY)], to serve as an ad 
litem judge in the Trial Chambers for one or 
more trials.” Although the ad litem model 
is not ideal, a comparison of the remedies 
for ad litem judge shortages provided to 
the ICTY and ICTR demonstrates that 
the amendment of Article 12 ter reflects 
the Security Council’s desire to accelerate 
ICTR proceedings, and will likely be effec-
tive at this point in the ICTR’s history.
The Security Council originally permit-
ted ad litem judges in the ICTY and ICTR 
so the tribunals could expedite fulfill-
ment of their completion strategies. Daryl 
Mundis, Office of the Prosecutor Senior 
Trial Attorney at the ICTY, suggests that 
the adoption of completion strategies by 
the ad hoc criminal tribunals has resulted 
in the justification, in part, of policies that 
would otherwise not have been imple-
mented. The creation of ad litem judge 
pools seems to be one such policy. Ideally, 
permanent judges would preside over all 
cases because they can most effectively 
preserve institutional memory, which is 
particularly important given the length and 
complexity of the tribunals’ cases. In com-
parison, ad litem judges may not provide 
the same level of continuity during and 
between cases. Nevertheless, the Security 
Council adopted the ad litem model in 
response to shortages of permanent judges, 
but shortages of ad litem judges ensued.
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While the statutes of the ICTY and 
ICTR contain many similar provisions, the 
amended Article 12 ter of the ICTR Statute 
differs considerably from the comparable 
article of the ICTY Statute, Article 13 ter. 
In 2005, the Security Council amended 
the ICTY Statute to permit reelection of 
ad litem judges, a practice previously pro-
hibited under Article 13 ter (1)(e). The 
amended ICTR Statute did not change 
the language of Article 12 ter to permit 
the reelection of ad litem judges. Instead, 
Article 12 ter (3) was added, which permits 
the Secretary-General to appoint a former 
ICTR or ICTY ad litem judge “if there 
are no ad litem judges remaining on the 
roster or if no ad litem judge on the roster 
is available for appointment, and if it is not 
possible to assign a judge currently serving 
at the International Tribunal . . . .”
The Security Council’s decision to add 
a paragraph to Article 12 ter of the ICTR 
Statute rather than amend its existing pro-
visions was likely influenced by the near 
completion of the ICTR’s mandate. The 
ICTR aims to complete all trial proceed-
ings by the end of 2011 and all appeals 
proceedings by the end of 2013, if no 
additional indictees are arrested. By con-
trast, the ICTY aims to render all judg-
ments by the end of 2012. Anticipating 
a longer period during which the need 
to fill ad litem judge vacancies might 
arise, the Security Council amended the 
ICTY Statute in 2005 to permit the reelec-
tion, rather than appointment, of ad litem 
judges. However, the amendments to the 
ICTR Statute will likely apply for only two 
to three years. The language of Article 12 
ter (3) removes the ICTR’s reliance on the 
nomination and election processes of ad 
litem judges as detailed in Article 12 ter 
(1). Under Article 12 ter (1), at least thirty-
six judges must be nominated by Member 
States, from which eighteen judges are 
elected by the General Assembly. Article 
12 ter (3) allows the ICTR to circumvent 
these requirements and thus, serves as an 
efficient mechanism for filling ad litem 
judge vacancies as they arise.
In his October 8, 2010 speech before 
the UN General Assembly Judge Byron 
stated, “the Tribunal’s achievements will 
be ultimately judged by the quality of its 
trials and judgments and by the efficiency 
of its judicial management.” While the ad 
litem model is not the most ideal long-term 
solution to judge shortages in interna-
tional criminal tribunals, the amendment 
to Article 12 ter of the ICTR Statute is an 
appropriate solution to the ICTR’s current 
ad litem judge shortage. In light of the 
Security Council’s clear desire to expedite 
ICTR proceedings, and the impending ful-
fillment of the tribunal’s completion strat-
egy, the amended ad litem procedure will 
likely be effective.
appealS cHaMber reStrictS 
iMMunity oF deFenSe counSel
On October 6, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a 
decision concerning the extent of immu-
nity afforded to ICTR defense counsel. 
On May 28, 2010, Rwandan authorities 
arrested defense counsel Peter Erlinder 
for allegedly violating Rwanda’s genocide 
denial laws. Erlinder represents defen-
dant Aloys Ntabakuze in the Bagosora 
et al case currently before the ICTR. 
Members of the international community 
protested Erlinder’s arrest, and other ICTR 
defense lawyers threatened to boycott pro-
ceedings before the tribunal. Ntabakuze 
filed a motion requesting that the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTR order the Rwandan 
government to immediately release 
Erlinder and stop all proceedings against 
him. Also, in accordance with advice from 
the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the ICTR 
requested the Rwandan government to 
“formally assert immunity” for Erlinder, 
and to release him immediately, on the 
basis of the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the UN (CPIUN), to 
which Rwanda is a party. The High Court 
of Rwanda released Erlinder for health 
reasons on June 17, 2010, but ordered that 
investigations into his case continue.
In its October decision, the Appeals 
Chamber denied Erlinder full immu-
nity from liability under Rwandan law, 
thereby permitting the Prosecutor General 
of Rwanda to continue its investigation. 
Although the Appeals Chamber’s decision 
limiting the immunity provided to defense 
counsel corresponds with the provisions of 
the CPIUN and the practices of other inter-
national courts, in practice, the decision 
raises challenges, particularly concerning 
possible infringements on the rights of the 
accused.
Section 22(b) of the CPIUN accords 
experts performing missions for the UN, 
including ICTR defense counsel, immunity 
from legal process “in respect of words 
spoken or written and acts done by them 
in the course of the performance of their 
mission,” even after the termination of 
their employment on UN missions. ICTR 
defense attorney Kate Gibson suggests 
this clause can, and perhaps should be 
interpreted as granting blanket immunity 
from legal process to ICTR defense coun-
sel in any country that is a signatory to the 
CPIUN. This broad interpretation is unde-
sirable because of policy considerations 
such as the possible exploitation of the lim-
itless protection under blanket immunity. 
Additionally, the purpose of granting coun-
sel immunity is not to eliminate account-
ability for possible violations of national 
laws; rather, it is to ensure the smooth 
operation of the tribunal. As Section 20 of 
the CPIUN states, “immunities are granted 
to officials in the interests of the United 
Nations and not for the personal benefit of 
the individuals themselves.”
Because it would not be tailored to 
serve the purposes of the UN mission, 
granting full immunity to defense counsel 
is not appropriate. However, restricting 
immunity raises challenges as well. In their 
Statement and Appeal to Rwanda, ICTR 
defense attorneys noted that Erlinder’s 
detention and prosecution “seriously com-
promises [their] missions by undermining 
[their] independence and by preventing 
the carrying out of [their] duties” at the 
ICTR. The Bagasora et al case is currently 
awaiting a hearing on appeal, for which all 
documents have been filed, but no date has 
yet been assigned. Therefore, Erlinder’s 
arrest did not prevent the other members 
of the defense team from carrying out their 
duties. However, in many other situations, 
the arrest of defense counsel would impede 
a defense team’s work on a case, especially 
at the pre-trial or trial stages. The defense 
counsel’s restricted ability to carry out his 
or her duties could infringe on the rights 
of the accused, as described in Articles 19 
and 20 of the ICTR Statute, particularly 
the right to a fair and expeditious trial. 
Restricting defense counsels’ immunity 
from legal action could also be problem-
atic if a state’s laws are not consistent with 
international norms. For instance, if an 
ICTR defense lawyer is arrested pursuant 
to a state’s domestic law that infringes on 
basic human rights, state sovereignty gen-
erally precludes the tribunal from compel-
ling the state to release the lawyer.
The Appeals Chamber’s ruling reflects 
the general practice of international courts 
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JudgMent SuMMarieS: international 
criMinal tribunal For rWanda
JudgMent SuMMary: the ProseCutor v. 
ePhrem setako, caSe no. ictr-04-81-t
On February 25, 2010, Trial Chamber 
I at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda issued its judgment in Prosecutor 
v. Ephrem Setako. The indictment charged 
Setako with six counts: genocide or com-
plicity in genocide; murder and extermi-
nation as crimes against humanity; and 
serious violations (violence to life and pil-
laging) of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol II. 
The Trial Chamber found Setako guilty of 
genocide, extermination as a crime against 
humanity, and violence to life as a war 
crime and sentenced him to twenty-five 
years of imprisonment.
Setako was born in 1949 in Nkuli 
commune in the Ruhengeri prefecture of 
Rwanda. He began his career as a mili-
tary officer and eventually obtained the 
rank of lieutenant colonel. After graduat-
ing with a degree in law in 1977, he began 
working with the Ministry of Defense 
in Kigali. Following the signing of the 
Arusha Accords in August 1993, Setako 
was appointed to head the Rwandan del-
egation of the Neutral Military Observers 
Group of the Organization of African Unity 
(NMOG). In 1994, he attained the level of 
head of the Division of Legal Affairs within 
the Ministry of Defense. According to the 
indictment, in this capacity, Setako par-
ticipated in a meeting with several promi-
nent national and local personalities for 
the purpose of planning and carrying out 
the extermination of Tutsis following the 
death of President Habyarimana on April 6, 
1994. Setako’s alleged involvement in the 
ensuing conflict included calling on mili-
tiamen to kill Tutsis and congratulating the 
killers afterwards. The Prosecution further 
asserted that in Kigali, Setako acted as the 
unofficial liaison officer to the prefecture’s 
Interhamwe and, in that capacity, supplied 
the group’s members with weapons and 
contributed to looting throughout the city.
In its factual findings, the Trial 
Chamber determined beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Setako was involved in two 
separate instances of killing: the killing 
of thirty to forty Tutsis who had taken 
refuge at the Mukamira Military Camp on 
April 25, 1994, and the killing of nine or 
ten additional Tutsi refugees at the same 
camp on May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber 
found that Setako, along with other promi-
nent authorities, addressed a large gather-
ing of recruits and other soldiers at the 
camp in Ruhengeri prefecture on April 25. 
According to one witness, Setako stated 
during his address that “Tutsis and their 
accomplices needed to be hunted down.” 
Another witness testified that Setako 
“expressed surprise that Tutsis had taken 
refuge at the camp since they were being 
killed elsewhere.” That night, some thirty 
to forty Tutsis living at the camp were 
shot. The Trial Chamber further found that 
Setako returned to the Mukamira camp 
on May 11, 1994 with approximately ten 
Tutsis and told an officer at the camp to 
kill them. That night, the ten captive Tutsis 
were killed.
The Trial Chamber determined that the 
accused ordered the crimes on both April 
25 and May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber 
held that Setako’s position as a lieutenant 
colonel who hailed from the area provided 
him authority at the camp and that his 
speech calling for the killing of Tutsis on 
April 25, in addition to his instructions to 
kill the ten Tutsis he brought to the camp, 
established that he ordered the murders. 
The Trial Chamber further found that the 
proximity of the killings to Setako’s actions 
at the camp on both dates indicated that 
his instructions substantially contributed 
to the killings. Lastly, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the “content of Setako’s 
interventions” at the camp established that 
he acted with genocidal intent in rela-
tion to the killings. Accordingly, the Trial 
Chamber found Setako guilty of genocide 
for ordering the killings on both April 25 
and May 11, 1994. The Trial Chamber did 
not consider the second charge of complic-
ity to commit genocide because it was 
alleged in the alternative.
On the charge of extermination as a 
crime against humanity, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the killings on April 25, 
1994 were carried out as part of a broader, 
widespread or systematic attack against 
civilian Tutsis on the basis of their ethnic-
ity. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber held 
that Setako’s act of ordering the killing of 
thirty to forty refugees amounted to exter-
mination, which is the act of killing “on a 
large scale.” No charge of extermination as 
a crime against humanity was alleged with 
regard to the events of May 11, 1994.
Finally, in relation to the charge 
of violence to life as a war crime, the 
Trial Chamber found that the violence 
between the Rwandan armed forces and 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front constituted a 
non-international armed conflict during the 
period of time covered by the indictment. It 
further found that Setako and the assailants 
who committed the killings at Mukamira 
camp acted in furtherance of the existing 
armed conflict or under its guise. At the 
same time, the Trial Chamber found that 
the victims at Mukamira camp were civil-
ians who had taken refuge with their family 
members at the camp and were not taking 
active part in the hostilities. Consequently, 
the Trial Chamber held Setako guilty of 
violence against life as a serious violation 
of Common Article 3 and of Additional 
Protocol II based on his order to kill the 
Tutsis at the camp.
The Trial Chamber dismissed the 
charges of murder as a crime against 
humanity and pillage as a war crime in 
relation to the events at Mukamira camp 
because the Prosecution failed to establish 
Setako’s involvement beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Trial Chamber also dismissed 
to limit defense counsel’s immunity from 
liability under national laws. Article 30 
of the ICTY Statute is nearly identical to 
Article 29 of the ICTR Statute, both of 
which provide that immunities afforded to 
the judges, the Prosecutor, the Registrar, 
and related staff, of the tribunals are those 
included in the CPIUN. Additionally, 
Article 18(b) of the Agreement on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Criminal Court incorporates 
provisions that are nearly identical to those 
included in Article VI Section 22(b) of the 
CPIUN, as discussed above. The case of 
Erlinder’s arrest presented an international 
tribunal the first opportunity to clarify the 
boundaries of defense counsel immunity. 
Although the Appeals Chamber’s deci-
sion reflects conventional international 
law and practice, restricting the immunity 
of defense counsel, nevertheless, remains 
controversial.
Lindsay Roberts, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda for the Human Rights Brief.
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the allegation that Setako bore responsibil-
ity for the killings at Mukamira camp, as 
well as other killings of Tutsis, on the basis 
of a joint criminal enterprise, because the 
Prosecution failed to present convincing 
evidence to demonstrate that Setako par-
ticipated in any meetings or crimes other 
than the incidents at the Mukamira camp 
on April 25 and May 11, 1994. Similarly, 
the Trial Chamber dismissed allegations 
that Setako bore criminal responsibility 
as a superior for acts of Rwandan army 
soldiers, the local Hutu civilian popula-
tion, and militia members, because the 
Prosecution presented insufficient evi-
dence that Setako exercised effective con-
trol over the perpetrators of any crimes 
other than those that took place on April 
25 and May 11, 1994. While the Chamber 
recognized that Setako’s rank as lieutenant 
colonel in the Rwandan army indicated his 
influence and authority, his rank alone was 
insufficient to establish superior respon-
sibility. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber 
found no evidence that Setako’s position 
as the head of the division of legal affairs 
at the Ministry of Defense entitled him to 
legal authority over members of the armed 
forces or other segments of society, apart 
from his section at the Ministry. The Trial 
Chamber dismissed allegations of Setako’s 
superior responsibility for the events at 
Mukamira camp because he was directly 
responsible for ordering the crimes, and it 
would be impermissible to enter convic-
tions on both bases of responsibility for the 
same crimes.
In sentencing, the Prosecution argued 
that the Trial Chamber should impose a 
sentence of imprisonment for life because 
Setako played a prominent role in the 
crimes and abused his authority. In addi-
tion, the Prosecution claimed that Setako’s 
offenses were grave and that there were no 
mitigating factors. The Defense requested 
that Setako be allowed the fullest benefit of 
mitigating factors reflected, including his 
lengthy public service to his country. The 
Trial Chamber concluded that although 
Setako’s crimes were grave, his crimes did 
not merit the most serious sanction avail-
able under the Statute because the evidence 
did not show that Setako was a main archi-
tect of the majority of the crimes commit-
ted in Ruhengeri prefecture. Accordingly, 
the Trial Chamber sentenced Setako to a 
single sentence of twenty-five years of 
imprisonment.
Zsofia Young, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Susana SáCouto, Director of the War Crimes 
Research Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary, 
Assistant Director of the War Crimes Research 
Office, edited this summary for the Human 
Rights Brief.
JudgMent SuMMary: tHe caSe oF SiMon 
biKindi, caSe no. ictr-01-72-a
On March 18, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rendered its 
judgment in the case of Simon Bikindi, 
who was sentenced by Trial Chamber III 
to a term of fifteen years imprisonment 
for direct and public incitement to com-
mit genocide pursuant to Articles 2(3)(c) 
and 6(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal. 
The Trial Chamber based its conviction on 
evidence that Bikindi issued public exhor-
tations to kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove 
road towards the end of June 1994. Bikindi 
is a former composer and singer, and previ-
ously worked at the Ministry of Youth and 
Association Movements of the Government 
of Rwanda. Bikindi appealed both his con-
viction and his sentence, requesting that his 
sentence either be overturned or reduced. 
The Prosecution also lodged an appeal 
against the Trial Chamber’s sentence, argu-
ing that Bikindi’s conviction warranted 
life imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber 
ultimately dismissed all appeals from both 
the Prosecution and the Defense, affirm-
ing the Trial Chamber’s sentence of fifteen 
years in prison.
The Appeals Chamber began by address-
ing Bikindi’s fifth ground of appeal, which 
alleged that his prospects for acquittal suf-
fered as a consequence of the “ineffective 
assistance” and “gross incompetence and/
or gross negligence” of his defense counsel 
during the cross-examination of witness 
AKJ, a critical witness to the Prosecution’s 
case. Pursuant to Article 20(4)(d) of the 
Statute, an accused retains the right to 
be represented by competent counsel. 
However, as the Appeals Chamber reiter-
ated, all counsel working with the ICTR 
enjoy the presumption of competence, and 
thus the accused bears the burden of affir-
matively demonstrating incompetence suf-
ficient to occasion a miscarriage of justice. 
Furthermore, Article 19(1) of the Statute 
requires that the accused bring any alleged 
violation before the Trial Chamber. Failing 
that, an accused must demonstrate that their 
counsel’s incompetence was sufficiently 
manifest that the Trial Chamber was under 
a duty to intervene. Here, Bikindi failed 
to bring the alleged violation to the atten-
tion of the Trial Chamber, so he bore the 
burden of establishing on appeal that the 
Trial Chamber was obliged to intervene 
and failed to do so. However, based on the 
record, the Appeals Chamber concluded 
that Bikindi failed to meet this burden, and 
accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Next, the Appeals Chamber addressed 
Bikindi’s first and second grounds of 
appeal, which related to alleged errors on 
the part of the Trial Chamber in relying on 
the testimony of two witnesses – witnesses 
AKK and AKJ – to reach its conclusion 
that the appellant made exhortations to 
kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove road. 
Specifically, Bikindi claimed error on the 
grounds that, inter alia, the Trial Chamber 
relied on certain portions of witness AKK’s 
testimony, despite having found other por-
tions of the same witness’s testimony to be 
unreliable. In addition, Bikindi complained 
that the Trial Chamber improperly found 
the testimonies of the two witnesses cor-
roborated each other, even though there 
were certain inconsistencies between the 
two testimonies. With regard to the first 
alleged error, the Appeals Chamber held 
that, as a general matter, “it is not unrea-
sonable for a Trial Chamber to accept 
certain parts of a witness’s testimony and 
reject others.” Furthermore, the Appeals 
Chamber made clear, the Trial Chamber 
is not required to “set out in detail why 
it accepted or rejected particular parts 
of a witness’s testimony.” The Appeals 
Chamber also rejected the notion that the 
lower court erred in finding that the two 
witnesses’ testimonies corroborated one 
another, recalling an earlier holding that 
“two testimonies corroborate one another 
when one prima facie credible testimony 
is compatible with the other prima facie 
credible testimony regarding the same fact 
or a sequence of linked facts.” It is not 
necessary, the Chamber stressed, that the 
testimonies be “identical in all aspects or 
describe the same fact in the same way,” 
as each witness presents what he observed 
from his particular view at the time of 
the relevant events. Overall, therefore, the 
Appeals Chamber found that a reasonable 
trier of fact could have relied on witnesses 
AKK’s and AKJ’s testimonies when deter-
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mining Bikindi’s culpability and dismissed 
these grounds of appeal.
Another grounds for appeal raised by 
Bikindi was that the Trial Chamber erred 
by failing to take judicial notice of several 
facts related to Operation Turquoise, a 
United Nations humanitarian operation. 
According to Bikindi, Operation Turquoise 
troops would have been on the very road 
allegedly used by Bikindi to guide the con-
voy from which he made his public exhor-
tations to kill Tutsis on the Kivumu-Kayove 
road. The Appeals Chamber agreed with 
Bikindi that the Trial Chamber erred when 
it refused the Defense’s request for judicial 
notice on the grounds that the request was 
not timely. However, the Appeals Chamber 
also determined that the relevant facts were 
not capable of being judicially noticed, and 
therefore the error of the Trial Chamber did 
not invalidate the decision.
Next, the Appeals Chamber turned to 
Bikindi’s claim that the lower court erred in 
its assessment of evidence presented by the 
Defense. In particular, Bikindi submitted, 
inter alia, that the Trial Chamber made an 
“unequal choice of factors” in considering 
the close relationship between him and 
defense witnesses, while failing to consider 
that “a good proportion of these witnesses 
were Tutsi victims themselves” and had 
good reason to give evidence of Bikindi’s 
guilt. However, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that the Trial Chamber enjoys broad 
discretion when assessing the weight of 
certain pieces of evidence. Furthermore, 
the Appeals Chamber was satisfied that 
the Trial Chamber fulfilled its duty to con-
sider all relevant factors with regard to the 
credibility of the witnesses presented by 
the Defense. The Appeals Chamber simi-
larly deferred to the discretion of the Trial 
Chamber in assessing Bikindi’s sixth and 
final ground of appeal with regard to his 
conviction, namely that the Trial Chamber 
erred in concluding that Bikindi was an 
influential member of both the National 
Republican Movement for Democracy and 
Development and the Interahamwe, and 
that given his stature, Bikindi was fully 
aware of the impact of his public exhorta-
tions. According to the Appeals Chamber, 
it was fully within the Trial Chamber’s 
discretion, as the primary trier of fact, to 
make findings as to Bikindi’s perceived 
influence or authority, based on the totality 
of evidence presented.
Turning to the challenges from the 
Prosecution and Defense regarding the 
length of Bikindi’s sentence, the Appeals 
Chamber began with Bikindi’s claims that 
a sentence of fifteen years of imprison-
ment is disproportionate to the gravity of 
the offense, is manifestly excessive, and is 
unduly harsh. First, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that, although the Trial Chambers 
do have broad discretion in determining 
the appropriate sentence, Article 24 of the 
Statute nonetheless allows the Appeals 
Chamber to “affirm, reverse or revise” 
the sentence imposed, based on such fac-
tors as: (1) the gravity of the offense; 
(2) the individual circumstances of the 
convicted person, including any aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances; (3) 
the general practice regarding prison sen-
tences in the courts of Rwanda; and (4) 
the extent to which any sentence imposed 
on the defendant by a court of any State 
for the same act has already been served. 
As a general rule, however, the Appeals 
Chamber affirmed that it will not chal-
lenge an imposed sentence in favor of its 
own unless it had been demonstrated that 
the Trial Chamber committed a discernible 
error in exercising its discretion, or failed 
to follow the applicable law. The burden is 
on the appellant to affirmatively establish 
the error. For his part, Bikindi contended, 
inter alia, that the offense for which he was 
convicted should not be considered a crime 
of similar gravity to genocide and thus 
warranted a lighter sentence. According to 
Bikindi, the sentence he received reflects 
a determination that the two offenses have 
been placed on the same footing. The 
Appeals Chamber, however, explained that 
there is no “hierarchy of crimes” within 
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and that 
each sentence is imposed on a case-by-
case basis after considering the unique 
circumstances at play. Bikindi also argued 
that, absent established standards of sen-
tencing, the practices of other international 
tribunals or national courts should be con-
sidered. According to Bikindi, within those 
jurisdictions, there is an emerging trend to 
treat the crime of incitement to genocide 
as an offense less severe than the crime of 
genocide. However, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that, pursuant to Article 23 of the 
ICTR Statute, the Trial Chamber was not 
obliged to consider the practices of other 
jurisdictions other than Rwanda, which 
does not treat direct and public incitement 
to genocide more leniently than the crime 
of genocide. Lastly, Bikindi requested that 
the Appeals Chamber consider mitigating 
factors, particularly that Bikindi composed 
songs promoting peace and that he had 
in the past provided assistance to Tutsis. 
With respect to the first factor, the Appeals 
Chamber found that other compositions 
were indisputably used to spread Hutu 
Power ideology and rally perpetrators to 
take action. With respect to the second 
factor, the Appeals Chamber found that 
Bikindi’s assistance was selective at best, 
and that he only provided assistance to 
those in his inner circle.
As for the Prosecution’s appeal seek-
ing an increase in the sentence to life in 
prison, the Appeals Chamber held that the 
Prosecution failed to establish that the fif-
teen-year sentence was manifestly inade-
quate given the particular circumstances of 
Bikindi’s offense, and thus it affirmed the 
sentence imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law, 
wrote this judgment summary for the Human 
Rights Brief. Susana SáCouto, Director of the 
War Crimes Research Office, and Katherine 
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War 
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for 
the Human Rights Brief.
JudgMent SuMMary: siméon 
nChamihigo v. the ProseCutor, 
caSe no. ictr-2001-63-a
On March 18, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) issued a judg-
ment on an appeal by Siméon Nchamihigo. 
Nchamihigo – a former deputy prosecutor 
from Cyangugu prefecture – appealed his 
conviction issued by Trial Chamber III 
(Trial Chamber) on November 12, 2008. 
The Trial Chamber convicted Nchamihigo 
of genocide, murder as a crime against 
humanity, extermination as a crime 
against humanity, and other inhumane acts 
as a crime against humanity, and sen-
tenced Nchamihigo to life imprisonment. 
Nchamihigo appealed the conviction on 36 
grounds. Upholding nine of Nchamihigo’s 
grounds for appeal, the Appeals Chamber 
partially vacated the Trial Chamber’s find-
ings and reduced Nchamihigo’s life sen-
tence to a prison term of forty years.
Several of Nchamihigo’s successful 
appeals related to the Trial Chamber’s reli-
ance on the testimony of particular prosecu-
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tion witnesses, whose credibility had been 
challenged by the defense. For instance, 
Nchamihigo persuaded the Appeals 
Chamber of the insufficiency of the Trial 
Chamber’s reliance on the evidence of 
one witness to establish that Nchamihigo 
aided and abetted the killing of three 
Tutsi girls at the Gatandara roadblock. 
Specifically, according to the defense, the 
Trial Chamber improperly relied upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of Witness BRD, 
in spite of the fact that BRD was previously 
convicted for forgery and despite documen-
tary evidence that challenged a key por-
tion of the witness’s testimony. A majority 
of the Appeals Chamber agreed, holding 
that the lower court abused its discretion 
in the assessment of BRD’s credibility. 
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber found 
that the Trial Chamber drew conclusions 
that “so exceed[ed] the evidence” that they 
called into question the reasonableness of 
the Chamber’s inference that the accused 
played a role in the murders. Based on 
these errors, the Appeals Chamber quashed 
Nchamihigo’s convictions for genocide and 
murder as a crime against humanity to the 
extent the convictions were based on these 
three murders.
Notably, Judges Pocar and Liu dis-
sented from the Appeals Chamber’s hold-
ing, recalling that it is fully within the 
Trial Chamber’s discretion to determine 
the appropriate weight to be accorded to 
a witness’s testimony. They asserted that a 
Trial Chamber may consider a number of 
factors in assessing credibility, including 
the witness’s demeanor while testifying, 
his role in the event in question, the plau-
sibility and clarity of his testimony, incon-
sistencies between the testimony and other 
evidence, prior examples of false testi-
mony, a motivation to lie, and the witness’s 
responses under cross-examination. Noting 
the Trial Chamber’s findings that Witness 
BRD testified “in a forthright manner” and 
“stood firm under cross-examination,” the 
dissenting judges contended that the Trial 
Chamber exercised due care in assessing 
the witness’s credibility, and therefore the 
Appeals Chamber must defer to its findings.
The Appeals Chamber rejected a gen-
eral challenge by the defendant to the 
Trial Chamber’s reliance on uncorrobo-
rated accomplice testimony. After looking 
to the practice of other international crimi-
nal tribunals, including the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
as well as domestic courts, the Appeals 
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber has 
the discretion to rely on uncorroborated, 
but otherwise reliable, testimony from any 
witness, including accomplices, so long as 
the Chamber treats accomplice evidence 
with the necessary caution. According to 
the Appeals Chamber, the “main question” 
in evaluating the reliability of accomplice 
evidence is “whether the witness con-
cerned might have motives or incentives to 
implicate the accused.”
However, Nchamihigo successfully 
argued that the Trial Chamber erred in 
relying on the uncorroborated testimony 
of Witness BRK – an alleged accomplice 
to Nchamihigo’s crimes – to support find-
ings underlying the appellant’s convictions 
for genocide and extermination as a crime 
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber 
began its analysis by reiterating that, while 
accomplice testimony “is not per se unreli-
able,” in assessing the probative value of 
such evidence, “the Chamber is bound 
to carefully consider the totality of the 
circumstances in which it was tendered.” 
The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial 
Chamber failed in its assessment of the 
credibility of BRK’s evidence. Particularly 
unsettling for the Appeals Chamber was 
evidence that BRK awaited trial on charges 
pertaining to his involvement in the same 
incidents, suggesting BRK may have an 
incentive to minimize his own involvement 
and to place blame upon Nchamihigo. 
Moreover, BRK was not at first forthright 
in his testimony, and at trial he contradicted 
his previous written statement about the 
timing of the incidents in question. Based 
on these factors, the Appeals Chamber 
found that “no reasonable trier of fact 
could have found Witness BRK to be cred-
ible.” Judge Pocar dissented on account of 
his belief that the Trial Chamber exercised 
due deference in its finding that the wit-
ness’s evidence was credible.
Witness credibility was not the only 
reason that the Appeals Chamber granted 
Nchamihigo’s appeals. For instance, the 
Appeals Chamber overturned his convic-
tion for instigating killings in Shangi par-
ish because the indictment did not provide 
Nchamihigo with sufficient notice of the 
charges against him. Paragraph 20(a) of the 
indictment accused Nchamihigo of supply-
ing weapons to Interahamwe members en 
route to kill Tutsis in Shangi parish. The 
Appeals Chamber held that the Prosecutor 
failed to prove this allegation, succeeding 
only to establish that Nchamihigo “pro-
vided hospitality and encouragement to 
them by nourishing them the night before 
the attack.” The Appeals Chamber noted 
that the indictment must announce charges 
against the defendant with sufficient par-
ticularity, and that the Prosecutor is bound 
at trial by the specific facts that he or she 
alleges in the indictment. Thus, the Appeals 
Chamber held that Nchamihigo “could not 
have known on the basis of paragraph 
20(a) of the Indictment that he was being 
charged with instigating [the] Interahamwe 
to kill Tutsis at Shangi parish by providing 
them with hospitality and encouragement 
the night before the attack.”
Lastly, the Appeals Chamber found 
error in the Trial Chamber’s finding that 
the appellant instigated killings in Hanika 
parish. Witness testimony established con-
flicting accounts of Nchamihigo’s where-
abouts on April 11 and 12, 1994, when 
the massacre occurred. The Trial Chamber 
adopted an interpretation of the testimony 
that placed Nchamihigo in the parish at 
critical times during those two days, and 
convicted him of instigating the massacre. 
The Appeals Chamber emphasized that 
the Trial Chamber has broad discretion 
for making factual determinations at the 
trial level, but criticized the Trial Chamber 
for not providing an adequate explanation 
of its reasoning. The Appeals Chamber 
explained that this deficient explanation 
impeded the process of judicial review, 
and required a reversal of the conviction 
as a result.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, wrote this 
judgment summary for the Human Rights Brief. 
Susana SáCouto, Director of the War Crimes 
Research Office, and Katherine Anne Cleary, 
Assistant Director of the War Crimes Research 
Office, edited this summary for the Human 
Rights Brief.
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international criMinal court
KenyanS QueStion icc autHority
On September 18, 2010 Kenyan Cabinet 
Minister Mutula Kilonzo questioned the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) 
right to investigate and prosecute Kenyan 
nationals for crimes committed during the 
post-election violence. Days later, Kenyan 
businessman Joseph Gathungu claimed 
that allowing the ICC to launch an inves-
tigation would violate the country’s newly-
ratified constitution. While both Kilonzo 
and Gathungu assert that the new consti-
tution provides mechanisms sufficient to 
carry out such an investigation, the ICC 
has already determined that Kenya’s prior 
inaction shows an unwillingness to do so.
The assertions come in the wake of the 
ICC’s March 31, 2010 decision to initiate 
an investigation into crimes against human-
ity allegedly committed in the Republic 
of Kenya. The decision marked the first 
time that the ICC prosecutor initiated an 
investigation proprio motu (by one’s own 
motion) under Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute. Upon reviewing Prosecutor Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo’s submission, a majority 
from Pre-Trial Chamber II found that the 
Prosecutor’s request met the “reasonable 
basis to proceed” set forth by Article 15(3) 
of the Rome Statute. On September 21, 
2010 the Prosecutor announced plans to 
present two cases “against 4 to 6 individu-
als who according to the evidence, bear the 
greatest responsibility for the most serious 
crimes committed during Kenya’s 2007-
2008 post election violence.”
Through its recent refusal to arrest 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, 
accused of committing genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, 
Kenya challenged the authority of the 
ICC. Kenya’s failure to arrest Bashir is a 
direct violation of the Rome Statute, the 
treaty that established the ICC. Kenya 
invited Bashir to attend the ceremony and 
subsequent celebrations accompanying the 
ratification of the Kenyan constitution on 
August 27, 2010.
Kilonzo’s argument addresses the foun-
dation of the ICC’s jurisdiction to launch 
an investigation within Kenya. Regarding 
the ICC’s upcoming investigation, Kilonzo 
stated: “[W]e can say that Kenyan judges 
meet the best international standards. After 
that, I can even tell them not to admit 
the ICC case. Why on earth should a 
Kenyan go to The Hague?” This argu-
ment implicitly references Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute pertaining to admissibility. 
According to Article 17(1)(a), the ICC will 
determine that a case is admissible if “the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution.”
Kilonzo’s statement implies that Kenya 
is able to carry out an investigation or pros-
ecution. In order to effectively challenge 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, Kilonzo would have 
to demonstrate that Kenya can fulfill both 
the willing and able conditions, which may 
be unlikely given Kenya’s lack of coopera-
tion with the ICC to date. Even this could 
prove fruitless, as the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
in their March 2010 decision, cited the 
Appeals Chamber, which said, “in case of 
inaction, the question of unwillingness or 
inability does not arise.” Even if he were 
able to convince the Pre-Trial Chamber 
that Kenya is capable of carrying out an 
investigation, Kilonzo must still illustrate 
Kenya’s willingness to do so.
Pursuing another avenue for legal 
action, Gathungu filed a lawsuit before 
Kenya’s High Court in which he stated 
that Kenya’s new constitution does not 
allow the ICC to conduct an investigation 
in Kenya. His application goes on to say 
that, because the ICC is not provided for 
in Kenya’s Constitution, the court cannot 
investigate crimes, or determine the guilt 
of alleged criminals in Kenya. Gathungu’s 
argument may find its genesis in Article 
159(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, which 
states: “Judicial authority is derived from 
the people and vests in, and shall be exer-
cised by, the courts and tribunals estab-
lished by or under this Constitution.”
Gathungu’s assertion, however, is not 
supported by a more thorough reading 
of Kenya’s constitution. Article 2(6) of 
the Constitution of Kenya provides: “Any 
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya 
shall form part of the law of Kenya under 
this Constitution.” Because the Republic of 
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute on March 
15, 2005, Article 2(6) of the Constitution 
requires that Kenya accept the ICC’s juris-
diction. Also, the Rome Statute provides 
rules with regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction 
over States Parties. Article 4(2) indicates 
that “The Court may exercise its func-
tions and powers . . . on the territory of 
any State Party . . . .” Similarly, Article 
12(1) states: “A State which becomes a 
Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the 
crimes referred to in article 5.” In addition, 
Article 86 provides: “States Parties shall, 
in accordance with the provisions of this 
Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in 
its investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.”
The legal basis for Kilonzo’s argu-
ment, as well as Gathungu’s, is question-
able. Kilonzo’s challenge does not address 
Kenya’s failure to initiate an investigation 
or prosecution, while Gathungu’s does not 
comport with either to the Constitution 
of Kenya or the Rome Statute. Perhaps 
these arguments serve as an expression of 
concern regarding the Prosecutor’s unprec-
edented use of proprio motu, or greater 
overarching concerns with the ICC, but 
they do not express sufficient reasons to 
preclude the ICC from continuing its inves-
tigation of Kenya’s post-election violence.
icc appealS cHaMber reverSeS 
lubanga ruling
On October 8, 2010, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) reversed Trial Chamber I’s 
July 8, 2010 decision to stay proceedings 
in The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, as well as the Trial Chamber’s July 
15, 2010 decision to release the accused. 
By doing so, the Appeals Chamber may 
have begun to establish a precedent that 
sanctions are the appropriate mechanism 
to deal with the misconduct of an officer 
of the court, rather than ordering a stay of 
proceedings. The Chamber also decided 
that Article 71 of the Rome Statute is 
sometimes preferable to Articles 46 and 47 
when sanctioning a prosecutor, in spite of 
Articles 46 and 47’s explicit references to 
prosecutors.
Trial Chamber I ruled that a fair trial 
was no longer possible because Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo failed to adhere to 
the Chamber’s orders to disclose the iden-
tity of intermediary 143 to Lubanga Dyilo 
once protective measures were employed. 
The Chamber later observed, “the accused 
cannot be held in preventative custody 
on a speculative basis,” and ordered him 
released. The prosecutor appealed both 
orders.
In its decision, the Appeals Chamber 
found that Trial Chamber erred by resort-
ing to a stay of proceedings, adding that 
because the Trial Chamber’s decision to 
release Lubanga Dyilo was based on the 
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erroneous decision to stay proceedings, 
the decision to release the accused also 
had to be reversed. The Appeals Chamber 
explained that if there is a “conflict 
between the orders of a Chamber and the 
Prosecutor’s perception of his duties, the 
Prosecutor is obliged to comply with the 
orders of the Chamber.”
The Appeals Chamber noted that the 
Trial Chamber’s order to stay proceedings 
was premature, and that sanctions as pro-
vided under Article 71 of the Rome Statute 
were the proper mechanism by which a 
Trial Chamber could maintain control 
of proceedings. Article 71(1) allows the 
court to “sanction persons present before it 
who commit misconduct,” through means 
provided in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
The Appeals Chamber’s decisions may 
have contributed to the establishment of 
a significant precedent: the Chamber is 
likely to require an exhaustion of sanctions 
before ordering a stay of proceedings. One 
implication is that the outcome of a trial 
before the ICC may not be directly affected 
by the misconduct of an officer before the 
court. This promotes the idea that some 
matters of internal discipline — disciplin-
ary measures taken against officers of the 
court — at the ICC can be treated inde-
pendently from the Chamber’s decisions 
regarding the outcome of a trial. Even if 
disciplinary measures lead to a prosecu-
tor’s removal from the courtroom (or per-
haps from the position itself), the Appeals 
Chamber’s ruling indicates that this would 
be preferable to a stay of proceedings 
predicated on a prosecutor’s misconduct.
The Appeals Chamber may have also 
set a controversial precedent with its deci-
sion to look to Article 71 to sanction the 
Prosecutor. It is unclear whether Article 71 
applies to the prosecutor in the first place. 
Otto Triffterer’s Commentary on The Rome 
Statute explains:
Persons present before the Court 
in the sense of [A]rticle 71 are all 
those not belonging to one of the 
organs of the Court . . . . This nar-
row interpretation is confirmed 
by the fact that articles 46 and 47 
provide specific sanctions for mis-
conduct of Judges, Prosecutors 
and members of the Registry . . . . 
Persons of these three groups are 
protected by [A]rticle 71, however 
. . . do not fall under [A]rticle 71 
when committing a misconduct.
(Page 1351, Commentary on the 
Rome Statute)
It appears that Triffterer draws an appro-
priate distinction between Article 71 and 
Articles 46 and 47, given that the former 
makes no specific mention of the prosecu-
tor. In looking to Article 71, the Appeals 
Chamber may have unnecessarily com-
plicated the process of sanctioning the 
prosecutor.
By choosing not to apply Articles 46 
and 47, the Appeals Chamber may have 
created more confusion than clarity on the 
issue of sanctioning an officer of the court. 
It now seems unclear when it would be 
appropriate to use Articles 46 and 47. The 
distinction between Articles 46 and 47 and 
Article 71 does not lie in the magnitude of 
the offense, as both sets of articles have 
provisions for breaches of both a severe 
and less serious nature. Equally signifi-
cant is the fact that the range of penalties 
for misconduct has been greatly widened, 
making it more difficult to mete out appro-
priate disciplinary measures. The court 
could find itself deciding these matters in 
future cases.
Slava Kuperstein, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College of 
Law, covers the International Criminal Court 
for the Human Rights Brief. HRB
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